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For the past twenty years or more, acculturation studies have been taking
an ever more prominent place in anthropological field research, and understand-
ably so. The more we turn toward the contemporary condition of primitives and
others, the more we find ourselves involved in a discussion of the contact situ-
ation, its effects and its consequences. However, although we have a great deal
of data available concerning the results of acculturation, as Hallo well (1952) has
pointed out, we still know very little indeed about the complex mechanisms in-
volved in the formation of a new cultural amalgam. Nor is concern with such
mechanisms merely a matter of academic interest, since application of anthropo-
logical principles to practical problems rests heavily oh an understanding of the
processes involved precisely in situations of contact, whatever their specific nature
may be.
Various psychological tools have been applied to the problems of acculturation.
Hallo well (1945) and Gillin (1945) have, each in a different way, attempted to
utilize concepts of learning theory, speaking of rewards and incentives implied
in the acceptance of a new item of culture. Recently, Barnett (1952) has approach-
ed acculturation under the larger heading of innovation, with the help of Gestalt
principles of perception. In terms of learning theory, then, we may assume with
Hallowell (1945), that no learning takes place when there are no incentives for
learning, that no borrowing takes place when there are no incentives for such bor-
rowing. In other words, culture contact in and of itself is not sufficient to account
for the transfer of cultural materials from one group to another. Futhermore,
the incentives for the learning of the new cultural materials must already exist
among the potential borrowers. That is to say, the items to be borrowed must
satisfy the people's own culturally acquired drives. In order for an item of
culture to be borrowed, it must have potential meaning for those who would adopt
it. However, we may push the matter a step further and ask what happens to the
material once it is borrowed. What occurs in the interaction between a functioning
culture and a borrowed item introduced into it ?
In order to pursue these questions, we would like to add here a social-psy-
chological dimension to the concepts retention, reinterprelation and syncretism.
These concepts have been used by Herskovits (1945,1948) in the analysis of Afro-
americart materials. These concepts, we feel, carry an implict social-psychological
dimension which is to be developed, although Herskovits himself handles them
exclusively on the phenomenological level.
When, as a result of contact, a new cultural amalgam develops, some material
may be carried over unchanged from the period prior to contact. The term reten-
tion refers to such a maintenance of a feature of the old culture in a changed con-
text: an object, a belief, a behavior pattern. In order to be able to identify such
retentions, however, we must have knowledge of the culture in question at a period
prior to contact. In other words, we must be able to establish what Hallowell
(1946, 1952) has called a "baseline" of cultural change, and it is in the establishing
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of such a baseline, that ethnohistory makes its most important contribution to the
student of acculturation.
Retentions may be maintained in various forms: either unchanged, or with
certain internal modification. In Haiti today, for instance, quite a few retentions
of West African cultural materials may be found: in the way women carry loads
on their heads, in the preparation of certain foods and their names (e.g., the dish
called akasd). As to the modified retentions, they present a somewhat different
category, one of the group of phenomena termed reinterpretations.
Reinterpretations may be denned as the retaining, or adopting, of an element
from one culture into another, with change of function, meaning, use and even
partial form. We may distinguish between two types of reinterpretation. On the
one hand, there are those cases, where retentions from a previous period are modi-
fied in some way for greater coherence with changed patterns. The making of birch
bark objects by the Ojibwa Indians of Wisconsin, for the tourist trade.would be
an example of this. On the other hand, we find the somewhat more complex case
of those reinterperations which are based on material borrowed from a foreign
culture. Here we would do well to keep in mind Sapir's discussion of the con-
ditions under which cultural "lending" takes place. One such condition, says
Sapir, is:
. . . that the culture element in question be capable of detachment from its context
and comprehensible as such. There is no doubt that different cultural elements are
thus detachable or, what amounts to the same thing, capable of conscious formulation
by the native in quite different degrees. We have here a continuous gamut, ranging
from the zero, or almost such, of a vocalic or consonantic change to indicate some
subtle grammatical notion up to the maximum of what we may awkwardly term
"conceptual detachability" of a type of implement of clearcut form, material, and use.
Obviously, culture elements are transmissible, roughly speaking, with an ease that is
proportionate to their "conceptual detachability." Thus, we expect a ceremonial
dance as such to be much more readily transmitted than any notions there may be as to
its function; a myth plot more readily'than, let us say, the cosmogonic ideas which
serve as its frame; an element of decorative design than the precise mechanical
technique in which it is executed or its style of artistic treatment in a particular tribe;
a definite social custom, say the mother-in-law taboo, than the exact range of meaning
covered by a relationship term. (Sapir, 1949, p. 415)
Lack of "conceptual detachability" may thus be seen to function as one possible
barrier to cross-cultural interchanges, while cultural lending may be said to be
facilitated by such "detachability." However, for actual borrowing to take
place, there must also be a potential meaning present for the borrowers in the element
in question. That is to say, two groups independently meeting the same de-
tachable element in a contact situation,.might make a different choice in borrowing,
depending on the resonance awakend in terms of their own cultural background.
The fact that West Africans proved able workers in the sugar fields of the West
Indies, where the local Indian groups had not, might be cited as a case in point.
Given conceptual detachability, and the imputation of significance to a given
cultural element by a group in the contact situation, what happens to the elements
borrowed? As we have mentioned, one of the things that may happen is the
phenomenon termed "reinterpretation." That is to say, a conceptually detachable
element may be modified in some way in order to be incorporated into the way of
life of the borrowing group. It is this phenomenon that we wish to examine in
greater detail.
Barnett (1942) has shown that in culture change—and acculturation is only
a subform of such change-function, meaning, use and form of a given element need
not all change at once. It is precisely the independence of these aspects which
makes it possible for continuity to exist in change. Now the notion of "continu-
ity in change" may present a problem if we consider it from the point of view of
the two cultures that are, presumably, involved in the contact situation. However,
if we cease to think of cultures as reified entities, but rather think of human
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beings enculturated to one way of life or another, the complexion of the problem
changes altogether. At its roots, reinterpretation appears to be a psychological
process, and must therefore be attacked on that level, as well as on that of ethno-
graphy.
Let us consider an individual reared in a given culture. Unless we assume
certain innate, or biologically derived attitudes, we must admit that his attitudes
and orientations spring from his own past experience. This itself is largely cultur-
ally determined, since no individual may be said to live in a world of "naked"
realities, but rather in a culturally constituted universe, something that permits
us even to go so far as to say that people in different cultures do not live in quite the
same world, do not experience the same "realities." Seen from this perspective,
we shall find it not only natural, but indeed quite unavoidable that, faced
with previously unknown situations, the individual will attempt to deal with them
in terms of what he knows, in terms of the past, thus in terms of his own culture.
Indeed, it could not be otherwise, since no "reality" can be experienced without
being culturally interpeted. Thus, each culture represents a total "behavioral"
world" (Hallowell, 1942, pp. 1-8), a perceptual organization of the universe.
It may seem that cases of reinterpretation are numerous and easy at hand.
The transplanted African interpeted the teachings of Christianity in terms of his
own African view of the world. Similarly, the Europeans when faced with African
modes of behavior, interpeted them in the only way they knew how, their own way.
For although, as we have seen above, culture molds reality for us, this is not a fact
readily grasped, especially by the participant. It is in no way evident to him that
he is not dealing with actuality (with that which is), instead of seeing that he is
dealing with that which is as interpreted for him by his own particular experience,
and the experience of his group; in a word, by his enculturation. Thus Pere Labat
(1724, vol. 1, p.458), describing cases of African spirit.possession which he witnessed
in Martinique, tells us that these people are so obsessed and so horrified by the
devil, that when the devil appears to them they fall into convulsions as though
they were epileptics. Similarly, Father Le Jeune (as quoted in Hallowell, 1942,
p. 82) thought Ojibwa conjurers to have contact with the devil. In contemporary
Haiti, Protestant converts hold that people who smoke will become zombies.
If we wish to account for these examples, we must think in terms of the in-
dividual's encultruation to a given way of life. The only hypothesis possible for
us, then, will be one phrased in terms of the interpretation of new phenomena in
the framework of one's pre-existing patterns. Enculturation to a given way of
life provides the individual only with those choices or alternatives available
within it, or within that of its subdivision, in which the given individual is reared.
It does not include the great range of possible solutions to a given problem which
would be present, were the solutions of all cultures to be considered. Such a
possibility is indeed nonsense. In many instances the alternatives would be
mutually exclusive, either because contradictory or because inconceivable. Each
culture may be seen as a particular mode of adjustment, providing a limited range
of alternatives, or problem solution. In a culture where children are carried on
the mother's hip, carrying them on the back, tied in a cloth, may be excluded as a
possibility. Alternatives outside the context of a particular culture will not be
understood by those who live in terms of it. It is this limitation of alternatives,
this basic cultural provincialism, which makes it at all possible for people to
function. Without it, culture could not exist, children could not be trained,
personalties could not develop. There would be no certainity of what to expect,
no ability to anticipate reactions, no possibility of predicating the behavior of
others. All situations would require detailed investigations, and no routine choices
could be made. Only in extreme neuroses do we find anything ever; remotely
approaching such a situation.
Let us return however, to the problem at hand and to the instances of re-
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interpretation cited above. The first two, those of Pfere Labat and Father Le Jeune
represent pseudo—rather than actual reinterpretations. They are more nearly
cases of what we might call "cross-cultural misinterpretation." The Protestant
belief in zombies, however, and the identification of Africian gods with the saints
of the Catholic Church, on the other hand, are closer to the concept we have in
mind. Perhaps even better examples are the use of a bell and of the sign of the
cross in Haitian vodun worship, or the use of a printed prayer, sold in the Port-
au- Prince market place, as an amulet, worn on a string around the neck. We must,
then, distinguish between two phenomena that are functionally quite different:
the misunderstanding of the behavior of persons of foreign cultures in terms of
the known on the part of individuals whose own background is quite different, and
reinterpretation as such. The first case leads to an unwarranted idiosyncratic
view, which is in no ways meaningful to the actual actors in the situation. Thus,
Pere Labat and Father Le Jeune are passive observers in a situation where individ-
uals of other cultures are the actors. On the other hand, for true reinterpre-
tation to take place, it must be patterned and become a part of a culture which
results from a contact of two or more different ways of life, and which in turn
is different from any previously existing. The reinterpretation might be something
which involves the active participation of the group, such as the use of certain
objects in a novel way. This is exemplified by the French water faucets used as
sword handles in Madagascar, as cited by Linton, or the European use of Chinese
explosives for purposes of warfare. It is also exemplified in the previously cited
illustrations of the vodun use of the bell, the sign of the cross and the printed
prayer. However, reinterpretation may also be a matter of folk-enthnology:
that is, more or less standardized interpretations of the behavior of another group
in terms of one's own belief and attitudes—a culturally patterned form of pro-jection. An example might be cited from Haiti, where some informants were
firmly convinced of the widespread existence of vodun abroad, citing among other
reasons for such belief the fact that many upper class persons had gone abroad
to be cured and had returned to visit Haitian hungans, priests of the vodun cult.
As suggested above, phenomena of reinterpretation are to be divided into two
subeategories. On the one hand, we find those which derive their content from the
old culture, i.e., modified retentions. With reference to Haiti, this means ele-
ments derived from the African past of the population. Secondly, we find those
reinterpretations which derive from the culture (or cultures) with which contact
is established. The example of the Haitian Protestants seems to include both these
facets. Here the older Haitian belief in zombies, present at the time when Pro-
testantism was introduced, is reinterpreted to fit the Protestant concept of pun-
ishment after death. On the other hand, the Protestant taboo on smoking is re-
interpreted to fit the Haitian belief in zombies, which has persisted in the context
of a changed pattern.
Here we have a case of two-way reinterpretation. This is in many ways similar
to the process of syncretism. That term, however, has been reserved for a special
type of two-way reinterpretation, one in which the two or more elements fuse.
Thus in the example just cited, the two elements—one from Haitian belief, the other
from Protestantism—are tied together to make one argument. In the more typical
case of syncretism, an individual, for instance, might be known by two names—
or more characteristically, the identity of two supernatural beings, derived from
two cultural contexts, might be mingled. This is true of Catholic saints and
African gods in most of the Catholic Afroamerican area (cf. e. g. Herskovits, 1937).
Similarly, in the development of Christianity in Europe, Christian and pre-
Christian elements fused. Pilgrimages in Yucatan may be traced to both Maya
and Catholic European sources. Examples of this phenomenon, derived from
various acculturative situations and various parts of the world, and a variety of
time periods, may be easily multiplied.
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The process of retention, syncretism, and reinterpretation as a matter of
fact, seem to be universal in the dynamics of acculturation. In so far as diffusion
studies, on the basis of distribution maps and archaeological reconstructions,
attempt to get at the results of contacts that have taken place in.the past and
which we cannot fully document, to that extent these social-psychological concepts
are relevant there too. Sapir, after all, spoke of the conditions of cultural lending
and cultural borrowing with reference not to ongoing contact situations and
processes of acculturation. Rather, he was concerned with reconstruction of
past events on the basis of contemporary psychological and cultural phenomena,
which may be projected backwards in time. Thus the concepts discussed here are
thought to be useful not only for the student of acculturation, but to those con-
cerned with culture change in general.
In speaking of the mechansims of retention, reinterpretation, and syncretism,
we may perhaps go even so far as to say that only in so far as these mechansisms
do occur in a given situation, can we speak of acculturation. As Hallowell (1945),
has pointed out although contact is a necessary precondition for acculturation,
this fact alone is not sufficient, in the absence of other factors, to produce cultural
interchange. A number of studies have shown that culture contact may occur,
may indeed lead to specific symbiotic relationships, without resulting in accultura-
tion. One of the factors in such a situation may of course be that of the prevailing
power relationships; where one group is obviously dominant, the policy of that
group may be a further factor to be considered. Nonetheless, these rather striking
features do not alone determine the outcome of the contact situation. Where
barriers to acculturation exist, the processes of reinterpretation and syncretism
may be impossible and one of two outcome may be brought about. Either retent-
ions Wll occur in an unchanged context and acculturation, ex hypothesi, will not take
place. Or, as has been the case with some of the Eastern American Indian tribes,
there may be an apparent loss of interest in the old culture and what appears to be
total adoption of white ways. This is the case among the Ojibwa Indians of
Wisconsin. Here is a group that appears completely acculturated. As Hallowell
(1952), has shown however in psychological terms these people are much more
similar to the less acculturated Ojibwa Indians of Canada than was to be anti-
cipated from observation of overt cultural features alone. Thus, apparent total
cultural abdication may, in psychological terms, not be very far removed from
total imperviousness to any external contributions.
This would indicate a serious caution against concluding on the dynamics of
acculturation merely on the basis of an inventory of cultural content, without
taking into consideration the effect of a changing culture on the personality in-
tegration of those who live in terms of that culture.
While admittedly fragmentary, it is hoped that the present analysis may be
applicable to part processes of culture change in general, not only to accultura-
tion, since in a sense it becomes irrelevant whether changes are introduced from
without, by contact, or from within, by invention and discovery, or indeed by spread
from one class to another, (cf., Wolf, 1953). The primary value, then, of the
concepts of retention, reinterpretation, and syncretism may be that they permit
us some further insight into actual mechanisms of change, and thus give us a
greater understanding of the apparent paradox of cultural stability and cultural
dynamics.
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